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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 16

What Canada's Elections Mean for U.S.

by Mason Wade

In a landslide without precedent in Canadian history Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's progressive Conservative government was swept back into office in the general elections of March 31. The Conservatives won 209 of the 265 seats in the House of Commons, almost doubling their strength and more than halving that of the Liberal opposition in the majority-less Parliament which had been dissolved on February 1.

At that time Mr. Diefenbaker had appealed to the people to end the "intolerable" situation in which his minority government had found itself since the inconclusive elections of last June. The result was an overwhelming vote of confidence. Not only was Liberal strength cut from 106 to 49 seats, with not a single representative elected in six of the ten provinces, but the two minor parties were virtually obliterated. The Social Credit party was eliminated from the federal scene, losing all of its 19 seats, and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was reduced from 25 to 8 seats and left leaderless.

Canada, which last June had turned against the overwhelming dominance of the Liberal party for the past 22 years, has now given the

Conservatives the largest majority since confederation in 1867. The sweeping victory was hailed as a return to the two-party system, but as its magnitude became apparent, alarm was expressed that Canada had come closer to a one-party state than ever before in its history. Even if the CCF should make common cause with the Liberals, there is not much prospect of effective opposition to the Diefenbaker government for the next five years.

In the new Parliament, which the prime minister has promised to call at the earliest possible date, there will not be a single Liberal representative from the four western provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, while the CCF will have four from British Columbia and one from Saskatchewan. Quebec, with 25 Liberals, will be the core of the Opposition's strength, although one of the most startling features of the electoral landslide was the Conservatives' capture of 50 seats in that traditional Liberal stronghold. From Ontario the Liberals will have 15 representatives and the CCF, 3. In the Atlantic provinces the Liberals will have no representation from Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, three members from New Brunswick

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and five from Newfoundland, the only province unaffected by the Tory landslide. The Liberals might be hard put to maintain their identity as a national party, as the Conservatives were under the long Liberal dominance, if it were not for the fact that the Conservative victory was not as overwhelming in terms of the popular vote (53 percent) as it was in terms of seats. Now that drastic swings in public opinion are becoming evident in Canada, the Conservatives might encounter trouble in another election if they fail to make good on their campaign promises.

Why Conservatives Won

While it had been recognized in advance that the Conservatives stood a good chance to win a clear majority, the extent of their victory and the obliteration of the minor parties confuted all calculations. What produced the Conservative landslide? Primarily, Canadian voters decided to finish the job of ending the long Liberal dominance which they began in last June's indecisive elections. They decided to give the Diefenbaker government the mandate it requested to carry out its long-term program unhampered by the hobbles of a minority government. Reverting to the electoral habits of the eras of Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the voters responded to the dynamic personality of a flamboyant party leader rather than to the merits of individual candidates. Throughout the country they supported young, unknown Conservatives and repudiated able and experienced vet-

erans of the other political parties.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker clearly caught the imagination of the Canadian electorate with his fervid, emotional appeals for support of his vision of a greater Canada. He played skillfully on the chauvinism that has grown steadily in Canada in recent years. Mr. Pearson's reasoned approach to Canada's problems and his unfamiliarity with the more dramatic techniques of politics found little favor in comparison with his opponent's evangelistic methods. The voters refused to hold a minority government which has been in power only nine months responsible for widespread unemployment and recession, despite the Liberals' effort to make capital of past prosperity under their regime and to revive the memory of acute depression under the Conservatives in the early 1930's. Canadians supported Mr. Diefenbaker's recession remedy of a vast program of public works which would favor national development over Mr. Pearson's program of sweeping tax cuts.

For Americans the most interesting aspect of the Conservative triumph is its possible effects on Canadian-American relations. In recent years these relations have become more complex and sensitive, and there have been an increasing number of serious differences and minor irritations to offset the basic good will between the two nations. The March vote indicates that the Canadian people support Mr. Diefenbaker's program of "preserving for the people of Canada control of their

own economic and political destiny," rather than Mr. Pearson's call to halt the deterioration of the trade relationship with the United States. The vote can be construed as a mandate to carry through the Conservative program of shifting 15 percent of Canada's trade from the United States to Britain and to develop trade with the rest of the Commonwealth. These matters will be discussed at the Commonwealth trade conference to be held in Canada next September.

The vote will probably mean a stiffening of the Canadian government's attitude toward American restrictions on Canadian exports and the possibility of retaliatory legislation if Congress pays no heed to complaints about the treatment of Canadian oil, wheat, lead and zinc, and manufactured products. Mr. Diefenbaker, as the leader of a party traditionally devoted to a high tariff and the protection of Canadian industry, may prove sensitive to demands for a bargaining tariff which would cut United States imports and reduce the Canadian trade deficit. A tariff war and a vicious circle of retaliatory legislation could drastically alter the nature of the Canadian-American relationship. Goodwill is no longer enough; it must be backed by action which indicates that the United States regards Canada as a vital economic, political and military ally, in peace as in war.

Mr. Wade, director of the Canadian studies program at the University of Rochester, is coauthor of *Headline Series* No. 103, "Canada: A Great Small Power" (January-February 1954).

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Nuclear Tests: Propaganda or Necessity?

As seen in Washington, Russia's renunciation of nuclear tests cannot be dismissed as "nothing but propaganda"—to quote Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; or as just a "gimmick"—to quote President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

It is true the Soviet proposal is propaganda. It is true it is a gimmick. The Russians made the announcement only after they had finished their own tests—and in some of these tests quite "dirty" bombs were used.

Not only that, but they tied a qualification to their statement which deprived it of any value. Quite aware that the United States was about to start its own series of tests, they asserted the U.S.S.R. could not be tied to a promise to stop theirs if the West were to continue testing. So Russia took back with the left hand what it offered with the right.

But the phoniness of the proposal does not lessen its effectiveness as propaganda. It again made the U.S.S.R. seem to be a champion of disarmament and East-West cooperation and the United States seem to be a weapons-mad warmonger.

Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles conceded that the U.S.S.R. had won a considerable propaganda victory with its announcement—however phony it may be. And throughout the world it was recognized as a propaganda defeat for the West comparable only to the earlier spectacle of the Russians orbiting a sputnik ahead of the United States.

Mr. Dulles' explanation of our inability to beat Moscow at propaganda is that Washington cannot stoop to the deceitful techniques of the

Russians. The way to beat Russia in the propaganda battle, however, is not with silence, with no propaganda, but with better propaganda.

Our officials could have exposed the Soviet test-ban offer for its phoniness (for they knew it was coming weeks before Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko made the announcement), but they hesitated and decided to sit tight.

But the test-ban issue is not just a propaganda matter. It is a military matter, a scientific issue, a diplomatic problem. The United States is loathe to renounce nuclear tests, in fact opposes an end to testing at this time, because it thinks testing is still militarily necessary. Only by more tests, the military argue, can the United States make smaller, cleaner, nuclear weapons. Only by more tests can the United States develop the antimissile missile and the ICBM's. Perhaps in a few years testing could be abandoned, but not now, say the military.

The scientists, for their part, believe that testing, particularly underground testing, has great possibilities. They think it will lead to vast economic use and development. But peaceful testing, some of them contend, could well be separated from the testing of weapons: it could be done under control and inspection, and even through international cooperation.

Diplomatic Issues

The diplomatic issues involved in this question are serious on two counts. In the first place the U.S.S.R. and the West are so suspicious of each other, so antagonistic, that honest negotiation is next to impossible.

Secondly, the United States has its allies to consider. Britain and France do not want to have to give up testing—the British have just started their nuclear tests, and the French want to begin shortly. But our allies could possibly accept a test ban if the United States were to revise the Atomic Energy Act and share its nuclear weapons with them. In any event it could be possible to separate our testing from that of Britain and France and have any East-West agreement for the moment cover only the Big Two—the United States and the U.S.S.R.

After our forthcoming series of tests is over, it could well be that Washington will offer to suspend further nuclear tests, for a period at least, if the Russians also renounce any more testing. Mr. Dulles, it is understood, is not averse to testing a test ban. The opposition, it is expected, would come from the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. And for all of his influence with the President it is doubtful if Mr. Dulles could carry the day with him in an argument on banning tests.

The fallout argument involved in the testing issue is one that only the experts can resolve—assuming they know. There seems little question, however, that the fallout (at least from these latest Soviet tests) was considerable. And however "clean" the bombs the United States may use in its tests, no one here is claiming they are going to be 100 percent "clean".

The detection argument, too, is one on which the experts can agree—if agreement is possible. The AEC

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U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World

As the United States and the U.S.S.R. continue their long drawn out diplomatic bout preliminary to the encounter on the summit, which now seems again more likely, one question is asked with increasing frequency. This question is whether the United States is aware of the rapid changes that are taking place in the international landscape or whether in some cases it may not be mistaking the shadow of events for the substance.

Will Nasser Succeed?

Take half-a-dozen news items from the headlines. In the Middle East Washington had assumed that Nasser, whom many of our commentators have called "bandit" and "scoundrel," would fail in his bid for leadership of the Arabs and that our staunchest supporter would be King Saud of Saudi Arabia. Yet Nasser has so far achieved a spectacular success. Out of the debris of the Anglo-French attack on Suez he has emerged to play his chosen role of successor to Saladin and has not only joined Syria to Egypt and brought Yemen within the orbit of the United Arab Republic, but has had the satisfaction of "seeing King Saud," whom he had accused of plotting his assassination, yield supreme power to Saud's brother, Prince Faisal, regarded as sympathetic to Nasser. And the World Bank has agreed to help Egypt widen, deepen and improve the Suez Canal.

If Nasser succeeds in his bid for Arab leadership, he will not only control the two means of channeling oil exports—the canal and Syria's pipelines—but may also gain access to the oil resources of Saudi Arabia.

And it now appears that Egypt, with Russia's help, may outflank Britain's remaining strategic position at Aden by building a naval base manned with Polish submarines. Did the United States fail to understand the significance of Nasser, overestimate Saud, and miscalculate the importance of nationalism and the desire for social change in the Middle East?

In Europe Washington has acted on the assumption that West Germany is our principal bastion against Communist Russia, that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is our unshakable ally, and that the Germans would readily see the advantage of accepting missile bases on their territory. Yet in spite of the fact that Adenauer on March 25 won a victory in the Bundestag, lower house of Parliament, for acceptance of missile bases, the bitter debate over this step has shaken the chancellor's position, and the issue is still far from being settled.

Russo-German Trade Pact

Meanwhile, after more than eight months of negotiations, West Germany and the U.S.S.R. concluded an agreement on April 8, which calls for repatriation of all German citizens who wish to leave Soviet territory and return to Germany, and for doubling this year of the volume of trade between the two countries. According to the agreement a two-way exchange of goods valued at \$7.5 million is to take place before the end of 1960. Among the items to be exported by West Germany are many kinds of machinery, tools and equipment, as well as chemical products and some consumer goods. The U.S.S.R., for its part, will send Bonn

increased quantities of oil, coal, cotton and other such products. Soviet representatives in Geneva have suggested that Europe could ease its fuel problems by importing Russian oil as well as Russian and Polish coal. Did the United States underestimate Bonn's interest in Eastern markets? And will the success of the trade negotiations spur Adenauer's opponents, the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, to press more vigorously for unification, to which the West pays lip service but for the most part does not want? Is Britain's RAF marshal, Sir John C. Slessor, who favors the neutralization of West Germany, contrary to the views of our military experts, right or wrong?

In North Africa the United States has tried to remain neutral between France and Algeria, although many Americans, as well as Frenchmen, have been disturbed by France's failure to recognize the inevitability of a change in its relationship with Algeria. Today we are forced to make a fateful choice. In Asia the United States expects Pakistan, 40 percent of whose national budget is supplied by American funds, to serve as keystone of both SEATO and the Baghdad pact. Yet, as reported by A.M. Rosenthal of *The New York Times*, Pakistan is rent by political strife between its West and East wings, separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory; confronted by formidable economic problems; and weighed down by cynicism, corruption and defeatism. Which of these estimates of Pakistan is accurate?

And in the interwoven fields of foreign trade and foreign aid the Ad-

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Central African Federation: New Step in Africa?

by Channing B. Richardson

Dr. Richardson, associate professor of government at Hamilton College, 1952-57, is at present a Fulbright Fellow in Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia and of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Ever since its establishment in 1953 by the merger of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Central African Federation has increasingly been in the news. The reason for this is obvious. If these three British territories can grow into a harmonious federal community, a political answer will have been found to the *apartheid* that exists in South Africa, to the south of the new federation, and to the African nationalism that exists to the north, in Kenya. It would mean that small but permanent white settlements and huge African majorities had learned to live together in peace.

At the present time, however, the outcome of this multiracial experiment is in doubt. The federation, larger in size than the combined area of Texas, New York and California, is wholly landlocked. Because of its high elevation the climate in most sections is delightful and well suited to European habitation—in contrast to that of Ghana and Nigeria. The scenery, from Victoria Falls in the west through huge game reserves to Lake Nyasa in the northeast, is often spectacular.

The federation's mineral and agricultural resources are considerable. One of them, copper, is so rich that it occupies what is probably too dominant a role in the federation's developing economy. But it is among the country's 7.3 million inhabitants that the final answers must be found to rising political and economic pressures. By race and territory the federation's population is divided as follows: Out of the 2.5 million in

Southern Rhodesia, there are 175,000 Europeans, 2,311,000 Africans and 14,000 Indians; out of the 2.2 million in Northern Rhodesia, there are 65,000 Europeans, 2,127,000 Africans and 8,000 Indians; and out of the 2.6 million in Nyasaland, there are 7,000 Europeans, 2,583,000 Africans and 10,000 Indians.

Sometime in 1960 the Federal Constitution will come up for review before the governments concerned, including that of Britain. Before that date these 7.3 million people, working together, will have to find at least the beginnings of solutions to three decisive issues confronting them. These three issues are so vital to the success or failure of the federation that they could, if not handled well, wreck this promising political experiment. As might be expected, the most important concerns the handling of African affairs.

Problems of 'Partnership'

The 1953 Constitution states that "partnership" in racial matters was to be the official policy of the new country. This term was left vague and undefined. Power to legislate on African matters was reserved for the legislatures of the three constituent territories. Thus Southern Rhodesia could and does continue its policies of legal separation and social discrimination against the African, patterned closely on the practice in the Union of South Africa. On the other hand, continuing Colonial Office control of the two northern territories means that more liberal racial policies prevail there. The Colonial

Office has for years encouraged the development of responsible organs of local self-government in the hands of the African and the creation of a series of representative councils. Although discrimination continues to exist in all three territories, differences in degree and attitudes between their practices are becoming increasingly important and must be resolved before 1960.

It must also be noted that African public opinion, insofar as it is measurable, was strongly against federation in the two northern territories and is still strongly against it today. This is especially true of Nyasaland. Fears that Southern Rhodesian racial policies will dominate the federation, especially if the Colonial Office goes out of the picture after 1960, are still very much alive. The hope for self-government in the north, and even for an independent country like Ghana, is not dead. Africans in the northern territories talk about "unscrambling" the federation in 1960.

Constitutional issues probably do not bother the average African any more than they bother the average American. The daily application of laws and attitudes, however, strike home. Any liberalizing trends within the federation since 1953 are apt to be obliterated in the mind of an African who is pushed out of a restaurant or shouted at by a store clerk and told that 'boys' are not served inside the store. As always, the accumulation of these discriminations bears most heavily upon the small educated and leadership groups of the African community. And yet

it is from these groups, which are starved for normal social contacts with Europeans of similar interests, that the Europeans confidently expect moderate and responsible leaders to come. The educated African finds that his legitimate recreational and intellectual needs cannot be met in the almost totally segregated society throughout the federation. No wonder that he currently defines "partnership" as the "partnership" between the horse and its rider.

The less educated Africans share in numerous other pressures and restrictions. In most areas strict pass laws require the carrying of papers and documents justifying each coming and going. Segregated and vastly inferior bus services are sources of daily irritation. Housing accounts for a lion's share of the total African problem. Since 1953 millions of pounds have been spent on African housing. Yet tens of thousands of Africans living in European urban areas still lack any decent place to sleep. Scores of thousands are packed like sardines into new townships outside European areas. The population density of Harari, Salisbury's African township, is at least 22,400 per square mile. Many of the African townships are placed miles from places of work, necessitating long bicycle rides to work or, again, the use of inadequate bus service.

These, and other, issues dominate African affairs in the federation. They overshadow the increased aid to African education, health and welfare given in the past few years. Such progress as has been made is itself frequently overtaken by the rapid increase of the African population and its constantly rising needs and demands.

Economic Troubles

The second major issue facing the federation concerns its economy. Many of the woes of an underdevel-

oped country are now becoming apparent. They are due chiefly to difficulties concerning the land's primary resource, copper. This metal has been supplying two-thirds of the country's exports, one-quarter of the total national income and one-third of all federal tax revenue. About 25,000 Europeans and 200,000 Africans depend on copper for employment. Its market and price are, of course, far beyond any control by the federation. Overproduction throughout the world, the ending of stockpiling by the United States and the appearance of substitutes have all recently combined to threaten the future of copper. Some idea of the federation's impending economic difficulties may be gained when it is noted that from March 1956 to March 1958 the London price of copper fell from £436 to £160 per ton. And it is estimated that for each drop of £10 in price federal and territorial revenues declined by £520,000.

This disaster has produced repercussions which are felt in every area of the country's economic affairs. Unemployment, both European and African, is slowing rising. In a land which happily lived on credit (locally called 'the never-never') as long as the price of copper was sky high, people are now being severely squeezed by banks and creditors. The building boom is slowing down. Adverse trade balances grow as imports tend to remain high and at high prices, while exports drop. A Federal development program of £137.6 million for the years of 1957-61 has been sharply cut. The formation of local capital, always difficult in an underdeveloped land, becomes more so. The need for foreign investment increases just as economic prospects become dim. The federation's other and sturdy economic resources, tobacco, agriculture, asbestos and other mining, must carry heavier shares of the over-all burden.

The third of the major issues is the political one. Today politics in the federation are like those of any other frontier community. They are turbulent, very personalized and frequently not of too high a level. Since 1953, a total of 17 different parties have appeared briefly here. Only three major parties contend for the favors of the 55,000 Federal voters who have been enrolling. The differences between these three is almost wholly concerned with racial policies for, as throughout Africa, all politics are race politics.

Politics: A Racial Issue

The United Federal party dominates the political scene with 25 out of 35 members of the Federal Legislative Assembly and 24 out of 29 of the Southern Rhodesian Assembly. In its present incarnation, it was formed by the merger in late 1957 of the Federal party, led by Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky, and the United Rhodesia party, led by Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister R. S. Garfield Todd. Drawn chiefly from the urban middle and upper classes, the United Federal party's European membership includes some moderately liberal M.P.'s as well as many people who hold more conventional views towards Africans. The party, however, has made quite a point of encouraging African members, and now has six African branches out of a total of around 160. Since electoral districting, as in other countries, tends to favor rural representation, the party must pay close attention to the powerful farming interests which dominate much of the politics in the federation.

The political record of the party and its immediate predecessors reveals the ambivalence mentioned above. It recently got through a bill allowing whipping for the stealing of corn on the cob, a measure not likely to affect many Europeans. In

general, however, it has done much for the African. It has spent greatly increased sums on African education, housing and health. It has encouraged the growth of individual ownership of land among African peasant farmers and carried out vital soil conservation projects. It has established a multiracial university college. It has recently opened up a special Federal franchise roll to perhaps as many as 10,000 new African voters in Southern Rhodesia alone, and many more in the two northern territories. In an effort to give the emerging African middle class a stake in things as they are, it has made it easier for them to finance their own homes. The question, however, must be asked, Are these good works enough to satisfy the rising demands of the black majority in the federation?

The Dominion party is the party of the right, in spite of its tendency to obscure its policies by speeches expressing from time to time a liberal attitude toward the African problem. This party stresses the need for one common voters' roll with high qualifications so that voting rights will remain in the hands of the "civilized." It hopes for increased police appropriations to check what it feels to be growing "impertinences" among Africans. It feels that Africans are now being over-educated and are taught to ask for jobs the Europeans will never allow them to fill. The need for strict segregation in education and social affairs and, above all, residence, is a cardinal feature of the Dominion party's position. "Racial partnership has failed," recently announced one of its leaders. Within the past few months the Dominion party has been stepping up its organization and, at the very least, will serve as a strong check on any liberalism within the United Federal party.

At the other end of the political

spectrum is the Constitution party. Founded late in 1957 in Northern Rhodesia, it set up its first branch in the southern territory in March 1958. This party, wholly interracial in composition, asserts that the establishment of the federation was a grave step not justified at that time. It believes that since 1953 "almost no progress towards equality of treatment in public places and towards equality of opportunity" between the races has taken place. It advocates a genuine common voters' roll with qualifications low enough to enfranchise large numbers of Africans and urges compulsory education for them. It would closely control immigration into the federation to make certain that no European comes here and takes a job which could be filled by an African. Although it has drawn to its ranks some moderate African leaders and most of the outstanding European liberals, being closely connected with the interracial Capricorn Society, to date it has not been tested in any elections.

The Case of Mr. Todd

In the political arena dominated by these three parties the major political event of the past few months has been the persistent attack upon Mr. Todd, culminating in his resignation from the office of prime minister of Southern Rhodesia in February 1958. The revolt against Todd came from within his own party, and his colleague and leader, the Federal Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky, failed to come to his assistance. Todd is regarded by Africans as a man they can trust and as one who is devoted to their gradual advancement in politics and job opportunities. His downfall, therefore, is viewed by them as further evidence of their subordinate position and of their helplessness at the hands of European politicians over whom they have no control. At once, African leaders

who had been counseling cooperation with the Europeans and moderation in making demands, found their position becoming more difficult, while the position of Africans who distrust Europeans and advocate the use of violence to achieve their people's ends has been strengthened.

Constitutional Review

To add to all these problems, the constitutional review conference, to be held in 1960, is rapidly becoming a dangerous focal point for many hopes and fears on the part of both Europeans and Africans. The Europeans are prone to see it as the means by which they can shake off Colonial Office control of the two northern territories and acquire the status of a wholly self-governing dominion within the Commonwealth of Nations. The Africans see it as a last chance to appeal to British public opinion not to "sell them down the river" to the Southern Rhodesians. Both sides are very conscious that they must convince political parties in Britain of the rightness of their cause. Tensions and hopes mount as 1960 approaches. Someone is going to be disappointed.

So far there has been little constructive discussion of possible changes in the federation's political structure which might meet the three principal problems discussed here. Yet, in the federation, promise has been given of something better than anything hitherto achieved in Africa's multiracial land. If the federation succeeds in fulfilling this promise, the Western world will be in its debt.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Peter Bawtree Gibbs, *A Flag for the Matabele* (Philadelphia, Saunders, 1955); Nora S. Kane, *The World's View: Story of Southern Rhodesia* (London, Cassell, 1954); Philip Mason, "Masters or Partners? Race Relations in the African Federation," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1957, Vol. 35; "The Future of Central African Federation," *The World Today*, December 1955.

Newsletter

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only admits it goofed in announcing that the Nevada underground test last autumn was detectable merely some 250 miles away, when actually it was detected 2,500 miles away in Alaska. But the question how close one must be to detect small blasts is still unresolved. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan says that tests can definitely be concealed. Yet President Eisenhower argues that all but the very smallest can undoubtedly be detected. Mr. Dulles may be taking the most accurate position of all in asserting that the only detectable tests are the ones detected—although this formula does not do much to resolve the problem.

Meanwhile, the United States is going ahead with its plans for tests in the Marshall Islands in early spring; and the Russians are going ahead with their antitest propaganda. At his press conference on April 9 President Eisenhower said that he would "seriously consider" calling off further nuclear tests on a unilateral basis if our scientists reported they had learned all they wanted to know from this coming series of blasts. This comment is less important than it sounds, for the scientists, as well as Mr. Dulles, have already said that they do not expect these tests to answer all their ques-

tions; and how could they, since these blasts will not include testing of nuclear warheads, ICBM's or anti-missile missiles—weapons which the United States is determined to perfect?

The President's statement may be effective propaganda temporarily, but after the tests it could turn into a diplomatic boomerang.

NEAL STANFORD

Spotlight

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ministration faces a stiff battle not only from those who have traditionally opposed wider economic cooperation but from new quarters as well. There is opposition from the South, which, as it becomes industrialized, opposes imports; from independent oil producers who want further cuts in sales here of oil from foreign sources, whether or not controlled by American companies; and most recently from General Electric, which on grounds of national security demands stiffer barriers against imports of heavy equipment for producing power, such as generators and transformers on which British and other foreign concerns have offered bids sometimes lower than our own.

The United States has the power, if it wishes, to reconcile some of the contradictions that have emerged in

its foreign policy, and could suffer grave consequences if it fails to do so. The question is whether it is willing to see and define the realities of world affairs—not of 1945 or 1950 but of 1958—and has the courage to review its course on the basis of altered facts.

Four Needs

It is difficult to believe that Americans will not prove equal to this test of their intelligence, imagination and stamina. But to pass this test we shall need four things:

1. Unbiased sources of information, both public and private, and courageous editorial interpretation of the news;
2. Frank public discussion of controversial issues, which in recent years has either been muffled by government secrecy, as in the case of nuclear tests and radioactive fallout, or actually avoided by both government and citizens, as in the case of our China policy;
3. Willingness to blaze new trails instead of merely marking time on paths no longer traveled by our friends abroad; and
4. Realization that any course we take involves risks, but that sooner or later we have to make a choice of risks.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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